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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEVON GEE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a memorandum decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court denying his petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder. This 
Court upheld the conviction in State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 
498 P.2d 662 (1972). Then a petition for a writ of coram nobis 
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was denied by the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins on January 30, 
1973. This Court, in State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 148, 514 P.2d 
809 (1973), held that the coram nobis proceeding was an 
improper action. On February 13, 1975, the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, in a memorandum decision, denied appellant's j 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks the affirmance of the lower court's 
decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Upon stipulation of the parties, the transcript of 
the coram nobis proceeding on January 30, 1973, which was 
denied by the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, was received as 
evidence at the habeas corpus hearing on February 13, 1975, 
and is part of the record in the present case. That transcript 
discloses the following pertinent facts: 
During the appellant's criminal trial, while in the 
restroom# a lady claiming to be a grandparent, was showing a 
photograph of the deceased victim to several people in the 
restroom (T.20) . A juror, Mrs. Bertul, testified that on her 
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way out of the restroom, she happened to glance at the 
photograph (T. 18). The photograph was not shown to her 
directly and there was no attempt specifically directed to 
influence Mrs. Bertul (T.20). After previously examining 
photographs which were introduced into evidence at trial ; 
which depicted the brutalized condition of the victim, 
Mrs. Bertul testified that the glance at the photograph 
in the restroom had no effect whatsoever on her deliberations 
of the verdict (T.18,19). 
The lower court, which heard the appellant's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus, held in a memorandum deci-
sion that no evidence was adduced that would indicate that the jury 
would have reached any other verdict for the defendant, and for 
this reason, among others, denied the issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
TRIAL WHEN DURING A RECESS OF THE TRIAL A MEMBER OF THE JURY 
HAPPENED TO GLANCE AT A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE VICTIM. 
-3-
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The apparent general standard to be applied to 
jury conduct to warrant a mistrial has been set out in Utah 
case law. The two prong test consists of affirmative improper 
misconduct on the part of the juror, and the misconduct must 
be prejudicial in that a different verdict could have been 
reached had the influence not been present. 
This standard can be seen in State v. Crank, 105 
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943), where a juror and a prosecution 
witness engaged in conversation immediately before the case 
was submitted to the jury. This Court held that this conduct 
was clearly improper or misconduct, but because the case was 
reversed on other grounds there was no need to rule on the 
second element of prejudicial error. 
Utah case law in this area of the law fit within 
the standard of improper conduct and prejudicial effect, as 
seen by State v. Ahrens, 25 Utah 2d 222, 479 P.2d 786 (1971), 
and State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P.2d 941 (1925), in 
which there was overt improper conduct that had a prejudicial 
effect. 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The present case fails to meet this standard. 
The juror did not commit an affirmative improper act. 
She happened to glance at a photograph being shown to 
everyone in the restroom as she was leaving (T.20). . 
The photograph was not shown to her directly and there 
was no attempt specifically directed at influencing the 
juror (T.20) . 
There is nothing in the record which indicates 
that the juror entered the restroom with an improper 
purpose/ nor did she seek to obtain any further informa-
tion relative to the case. This conduct does not go 
beyond the usual amenities between jurors and acquaintances 
who appear upon the scene when the jury is not sequestered. 
This is shown by the following testimony: 
-5-
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"Q. One other thing. When 
you were in the rest room, this 
woman didnft come up to you and show 
you the picture; she was showing it 
to someone else, and you saw it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you overheard part of 
the conversation of what she was saying, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I assume when you did hear 
that, why, you got out of the rest room 
as soon as you could, is that correct? 
A. Yes, I said, "My word, I'm on 
the jury. Let me out of here." 
(T. page 20, lines 19-30.) 
" Q. You happened to see i t ? You 
looked over there but she d i d n ' t come 
up to you individual ly and show i t to you, 
did she? 
A. I just happened to see it. 
Q. You just happened to see it? 
A. Well, how can you happen but see 
it when she's showing it to everybody? 
Q. Actually, the picturesthat were 
introduced at the trial were of convincing 
evidence to you of his guilt, coupled with 
the testimony as to how those injuries 
occurred, isn't that right? 
A. This is true. 
Q. So there was nothing about the 
picture that you did see of the child in 
the rest room that was reprehensible? 
A. I wouldn't even know it was the 
same child. No, it had no bearing at 
all on my decision. I know the baby was 
harmed very brutally. 
-6-
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Q. But that was based on 
the evidence that was introduced 
at trial, i^n't that right? 
A. This is right." (T. page 
18, lines 20-23, page 19, lines 1-5.) 
"Q. Now, this woman who you did 
overhear and had the picture, she was ; 
not a witness in that case, was she? j 
A. No. i 
Q. As far as you are concerned, 
then, you don't know what she said was 
the truth or not the truth, is that 
correct? 
A. She was telling everyone that she 
was — 
Q. No, but what I mean, you did not 
know whether or not what you overheard was 
the truth or not, is that correct? 
A. Yes, Mr. Banks." (T., page 21, 
lines 1-11.) 
When a jury is not sequestered, the juror is to conform 
with the cautionary instructions of the court. He is to divorce 
himself from any prejudicial material and not take into con-
sideration any outside influences. This actually creates a 
presumption. In absence of evidence to the contrary, it should 
be presumed that the jury followed the court's instructions 
and the court adequately instructed the jury with reference to 
any outside influence. This case is the type of incident or 
occurrence that the cautionary instruction is designed to 
~7-
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protect; we cannot expect the juror to live in a vaccuum when 
he is not sequestered. This case does not meet the classical 
standard of jury misconduct set out in Utah case law. 
The second requirement is the prejudicial effect of . 
the misconduct. There must be a departure from what the evidence 
is or something that would materially bias or prejudice the juror 
in favor of one party or the other. After viewing the photo-
graphs which were introduced into evidence which depicted the 
brutalized body of the infant victim, there is no departure 
from the evidence when the juror happened to glance at a 
photograph which depicted as the juror stated, "a perfectly 
beautiful child lying asleep." 
In this case the juror was subjected to a rigorous 
examination as opposed to just an affidavit and the examination 
shows what effect the incident had on the juror's deliberations: 
"THE COURT: Do you remember Mr. . 
Lubeck asking you any other questions 
or your answering any other matters. Do 
you remember that? We are just talking 
about his conversation with you now. 
THE WITNESS: He asked me if seeing 
the baby, of the picture in the coffin, had 
any bearing on my decision. He asked me 
that, and I said, no. I said, "The only 
thing that had bearing on my decision was 
the things that happened in the pictures the 
District Attorney showed." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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THE COURT: You mean the ones 
that came in evidence? 
THE WITNESS: Evidence, yes. 
THE COURT: You may continue. 
Do you remember saying anything 
else to him, or his saying anything 
else to you? 
THE WITNESS: That that picture 
had no bearing at all. It looked like 
a perfectly beautiful child lying asleep, 
and it had no bearing, but I had seen 
pictures of that baby being burned and 
hit and hurt and the whole thing is so 
hideous, I hate to remember it." 
(T. page 11, lines 15-30; page 12, lines 
1-3.) 
; "Q. And it was based solely on the 
evidence that was put before you under 
oath at the trial, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you f o l l o w e d t h e c o u r t ' s 
a d m o n i t i o n no t t o a l l o w a n y t h i n g t o 
i n f l u e n c e you in y o u r v e r d i c t o t h e r t h a n 
what t h e e v i d e n c e had b e e n , i s t h a t r i g h t ? 
A. T h i s i s t r u e . My s i s t e r was h e r e 
w i t h me. We t a l k e d a b o u t m o t h e r , and we 
t a l k e d a b o u t o t h e r t h i n g s , bu t we n e v e r even 
d i s c u s s e d t h e t r i a l i n be tween o u r s e l v e s . I 
s a i d , " I c a n ' t t a l k t o you abou t i t . " She 
s a i d , " I d o n ' t want you t o , " so we t a l k e d , and 
h e r husband was f a i l i n g , and dumb t h i n g s l i k e 
t h a t . We d i d n ' t t a l k a b o u t i t . " (T. page 
2 0 , l i n e s 3 - 1 5 . ) 
- 9 -
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"THE COURT: Do you recall 
telling Mr. Lubeck anything else 
in this conversation? How long 
did the conversation last, do 
you remember? 
THE WITNESS: 0h# just a few 
minutes. 
THE COURT: About fifteen 
minutes? j 
THE WITNESS: No, not even j 
that long. A few minutes. He 
asked me if the picture that was 
shown to me in the ladies' room 
had any bearing on the case, and 
I said, 'Absolutely not.'" (T. 
page 12, lines 24-30; page 13, 
lines 1-3.) 
The juror restricted her deliberations to the 
evidence that was adduced under oath and there is nothing 
introduced that would indicate that this defendant was 
prejudiced at all by this particular incident. 
This record has been reviewed previously by three 
courts, none of which have concluded that sufficient prejudice 
was shown by Mr. Gee. Judge D. Frank Wilkins, in his Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the coram nobis petition, 
concluded as follows: 
-10-
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" (2) That one of the jurors, 
Nola V. Bartol, during the course of 
said trial, was in the ladies' restroom 
at a time when a woman whose identity 
is unknown displayed to persons a 
photo of decedent in coffin. 
(3) That at no time was the 
picture displayed directly to Nola V. 
Bartol. 
(4) That the said Nola V. Bartol, | 
upon realizing what was occurring, 
left the ladies' restroom. 
(5) That the incident complained 
of in no way affected the said Nola V. 
Bartol's deliberations as a juror in 
the case. 
(6) That the said Nola V. Bartol 
based her conclusion of guilt of Thomas 
Devon Gee upon the evidence introduced 
in the trial by the State. 
(7) That the photograph in question 
was not shown specifically to Nola V. 
Bartol but was displayed to the ladies 
present in the ladies' restroom at the 
time Judge Wilkins conclusion of law 
was to deny the petition for writ of 
coram nobis." (T.129). (Emphasis added.) 
Judge Willis W. Ritter in denying Mr. Gee leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis on a writ of habeas corpus concluded 
as follows: 
"Gee alleges that he was denied a 
fair trial because during a recess in 
the trial the grandmother of the 
murdered child had displayed to persons 
-11-
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in the women's restroom, while a juror 
was in the restroom, a photograph pur-
porting to show the decedent in his 
coffin. Gee attempted to raise this 
issue in a petition for a writ of coram 
nobis. During the hearing on the petition, 
the juror admitted that she had seen the 
picture, but stated that seeing the picture in 
no way affected her decision as to the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant. . . j 
"In summary, Gee has failed to show 
that he was denied a fair and impartial trial. 
Because Gee's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus fails to present any cognizable claims, 
his motion to proceed in forma pauperis is 
frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) 
and should be denied." 
Although the Utah Supreme Court did not rule on the 
photograph issue on the appeal from Judge Wilkins' coram nobis 
proceeding, and instead held that coram nobis was an improper 
remedy, this Court did review the facts of this case and 
summarized them as follows: 
"At the (coram nobis) hearing, evidence 
was adduced which indicated that during the 
course of the trial, while one of the jurors 
was in women's restroom, an unidentified woman 
displayed a photograph, purporting to show the 
decedent in his coffin. The picture was not 
specifically shown to the juror but was displayed 
generally to all those present in the room. Upon 
realizing what was occurring, the juror immediately 
left the room. She testified that the incident 
in no way affected her deliberation as a juror and 
that she based her conclusion of defendant's 
guilt upon the evidence introduced at trial." 
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Specific pages of the transcript which clearly show 
that no prejudice occurred are as follows: 
Transcript, page 11, lines 19 through 23, 29 through. 
30: only influenced by pictures district attorney showed in 
court. ! 
• • . • • • i 
Transcr ip t , page 13, l ines 8 through 11: the coffin 
pic ture had no bearing on her v e r d i c t . 
Transcr ip t , page 18 and 19: the photograph had no 
bearing on her dec is ion . 
Transcr ip t , page 20: photograph showed to everyone 
general ly in the restroooi/ not spec i f i ca l l y to ju ror , and juror 
immediately l e f t the room. 
Transcr ip t , page 25: r ea l reason why she almost hung 
the ju ry . 
F ina l ly , respondent submits tha t none of the a u t h o r i t i e s 
c i ted by appellant are on point with the ins tan t case . 
In State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P a c ' 3 5 6 (1901), 
a new t r i a l was granted a defendant in a cap i t a l murder case 
on the bas i s of two j u r o r ' s b i a s , formed pr ior to t r i a l , toward 
- 1 3 -
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the defendant. The court in that case noted that any mis-
conduct of a juror which prevents a fair and impartial 
consideration of the evidence is a possible ground for a new 
trial: 
"The cases are numerous which 
hold that misconduct by one or more j 
of the jury, which might have been 
prejudicial to the accused, raises the 
presumption, especially in a capital 
case, that the accused has been prejudiced 
thereby, and vitiates the verdict unless 
the prosecution shows beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the prisoner has received no 
injury by reason thereof." Icl. at 360. 
The Court in Morgan, supra, also rejected the prosecution's 
attempts to cleanse the jurors in question by self-serving 
affidavits to the effect that they (the jurors) acted impartially 
in determining the case. Much could be made of this if the 
facts in Morgan were not so inopposite to the present case. 
In Morgan the defense produced affidavits from 
several unimpeachable sources to the effect that two jurors 
had, prior to trial, stated that the defendant should be lynched 
as he was obviously guilty and later, neither juror denied making 
-14-
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the prior statements during the motion hearing. These same 
jurors during voir dire examination swore that they had 
formed no opinion on the issues in question. This compelling 
evidence overcame affidavits by the jurors claiming impartiality: 
"Each of these jurors in.his j 
affidavit states that he acted impartially 
in the case, but, in view of their false 
statements and concealments of the facts 
admitted on this motion, their statements 
are not sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption arising from the admitted facts." 
Id. at 361. 
What emerges from an examination of the Morgan case are two 
salient features: (1) That the prosecution can, if possible, 
show that an event, or act, can be harmless error, and (2) 
the probative value of a juror's affidavit is dependent on the 
circumstances surrounding the events purported to compromise 
that juror and therefore the jury's verdict. 
Another Utah case, State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 
237 Pac. 941 (1925), presents another circumstance in which 
affidavits by a witness and a juror were insufficient to 
overcome a presumption of impropriety. In Anderson, a juror 
had received a ride to and from the court from the prosecuting 
witness who had a vital interest in the outcome of the trial. 
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This was not an isolated incident but was continuous for 
approximately three weeks. 
Although the juror swore in an affidavit that he was 
in no way influenced by the courtesy rendered him by the 
witness, the court ordered the granting of a new trial: j 
j 
"The authorities, however, all 
agree that any conduct or relationship 
between a juror and a party to an action 
during trial that would or might, 
consciously or unconsciously, tend to 
influence the judgment of the juror 
authorizes and requires the granting 
of a new trial, unless it is made to 
appear affirmatively that the judgment 
of the juror was in no way affected by 
such relationship. . . . " Anderson at 
943. (Emphasis added.) 
Anderson amplifies the Morgan holding by noting that some 
circumstances alone, in the absence of shown prejudice, can 
so taint a juror so as to render him incompetent in a given 
case in spite of averments of impartiality. 
The Gee case, however, does not present even a 
slightly analogous factual situation. There has been no 
showing of actual prejudice on the part of the juror; rather, 
it is broadly claimed that the single incident of her viewing 
a picture was so inherently prejudicial as to render her unfit 
to be a juror. It is difficult to see how such an argument is 
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tenable. The juror had seen, in court, pictures of the actual 
injuries to the child's body, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 
498 P.2d 662 (1972) . Under these circumstances, the picture 
displayed to the juror in the restroom had lost any prejudicial 
impact that it may have otherwise possessed. The exposure was 
not lengthy, and did not involve, as far as can be determined, 
any party to the action. It was the "party" contact in 
Anderson which, coupled with the time element involved, raised 
an irrebutable inference of impropriety. The Court in Anderson 
acknowledged that contacts limited in nature present a different 
question: 
"We are not here dealing with 
one act of carrying a juror to his 
home as was the count in Hilton v. 
Southwick, 17 Me. 303, 35 Am.Dec. 
See also State v. Hockett, 238 P.2d 539, 172 Kan. 1; State v. 
Bryan, 153 Kan, 822, 113 P.2d 1052, to the effect that trivial 
acts are not grounds for a new trial. 
Because the act in question was so insubstantial 
under the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the defendant 
to show prejudice, as it should not be inferred. Other juris-
dictions also require an element of prejudicial effect.\ 
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In People v. Yee King, 24 Cal.App. 509, 141 Pac. 1047 
(1941), defendant was convicted of murder. Two jurors made an 
f 
unauthorized visit at the scene of the homicide. They discussed 
certain features of the case and locations that were diagramed 
and introduced at trial. The Court said: 
• •! 
"The unauthorized evidence received 
out of court was in effect but a reproduc-
tion of certain particular evidence pre-
viously adduced in court. No affirmative 
showing was made in the affidavits or by 
the testimony received upon the hearing of 
the motion for a new trial, that the 
two jurors in question had seen or heard 
at the place of the homicide anything 
different from or contradictory of the 
evidence adduced at trial . . . 
"This being so, it cannot be fairly 
said that the showing made in support of 
the motion for a new trial would have 
warranted the court below in finding that 
the visit of the two jurors to the scene 
of the homicide resulted in substantial 
injury to the defendant." 
In our case, the photograph was, at the most, a 
replica of what was introduced into the criminal trial and 
not a departure from that evidence, that could materially 
prejudice defendant's case. Therefore, this case fails to meet 
the second requirement of prejudice and respondent submits that 
under the circumstances of this case the defendant did receive 
a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
-18-
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Finally, the Gee situation is clearly distinguishable 
from the Morgan and Anderson cases in that the juror, Nola Bartol, 
did not submit an "affidavit" alleging that she had not been 
prejudiced by the photograph, but instead, personally came in and 
testified at the coram nobis hearing and submitted herself to cross-
examination by Mr. Gee's attorney (unlike an affidavit where cross-
examination is impossible). 
Based on the foregoing authorities, respondent submits 
the appellant has not established the juror's actual prejudice, 
and the facts are not such as to raise an automatic inference of 
irrebuttable prejudice. 
POINT II 
IF ERROR IS FOUND BY THIS COURT, RESPONDENT SUBMITS 
THAT IT IS HARMLESS ERROR AND IN ITS ABSENCE THERE IS NO 
REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THE VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. 
The main question here is whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the incident so prejudiced the 
juror that in its absence there might have been a different 
result. In State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 
(1974), defendant was convicted of robbery and assault with 
a deadly weapon. Defendant claimed prejudicial error because 
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of the prosecutor's inquiry as to whether defendant had used 
the same gun to perpetrate another robbery. This Court said: 
"That there should be no reversal 
of a conviction merely because of error 
or irregularity, but only if it is 
substantial and prejudicial in the 
sense that in its absence there is a 
reasonable likelihood that there would 
have been a different result." 
In State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297 
I 
! 
(1969)# defendants were convicted of murder in the first 
degree. The court refused to declare a mistrial when a police 
officer while testifying made remarks concerning "prison release 
picture" and "city police department photograph" of defendant 
was not prejudicial but harmless. This Court stated: 
"This court may not interfere 
with a jury verdict, unless upon review 
of the entire record, there emerge 
errors of sufficient gravity to indicate 
that defendants' rights were prejudiced 
in some substantial manner, the error 
must be such that it is reasonably 
probable that there would have been a 
result more favorable to the appellant 
in the absence of error." 
In State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966), 
defendant was convicted of attempting to obtain money by false 
pretenses and claimed prejudicial error in not being represented 
by counsel at the preliminary hearing. This Court stated: 
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"There should be no dismissal 
of'a charge nor reversal of a judgment 
unless there was a significant failure 
or abuse of due process of law, or 
unless there was an error or defect 
which it could reasonably be supposed 
put the defendant at some substantial 
disadvantage, or had some substantial 
prejudicial effect upon his rights." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), is applied to the . 
previously cited cases as well as to our case. It states: 
"Judgment to disregard errors not 
affecting rights of paries.—After hear-
ing an appeal the court must give judgment 
without regard to errors or defects which 
do not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties. If error has been committed, 
it shall not be presumed to have resulted 
in prejudice. The court must be satisfied 
that it has that effect before it is 
warranted in reversing the judgment." 
In our case, the defendant was not prejudiced, nor 
were his rights abused when the juror, unintentionally happened 
to glance at the photograph. The photograph itself was not a 
departure from the evidence introduced at trial; in effect, it 
was a replica of that evidence and did not substantially 
violate defendant's due process rights. 
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Therefore, the error being harmless under the 
previously cited authorities and Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 
(1953), respondent submits that this case does not warrant 
a reversal of the lower court's denial of the writ of habeas 
corpus on the grounds of prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
When the record is examined in our case the juror's 
conduct does not go beyond the usual amenities between a non-
sequestered juror and acquaintances. But more importantly, 
the photograph was a mere replica of the evidence; after 
viewing the photographs introduced into evidence which depicted 
the beaten victim, seeing a glance of a photograph of the victim 
in a peaceful state is not prejudicial. Therefore, respondent 
respectfully submits that the decision of the lower court to 
deny the petition of habeas corpus be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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